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Abstract
As expectations change, we may observe asymmetry in responses of economic agents over
various phases of the economic cycles. In this paper, we analyze both demand and supply
side information to understand the dynamics of price determination in the real estate market
and examine the relationship between expectation parameters and demand-supply mis-
match. Our hypothesis builds on the possibility that investors’ call for action in terms of
their buy/sell decision and adjustment in reservation prices may provide valuable insights
into impending demand-supply imbalances in the market. We study several real estate
sectors to inform our analysis. The timeframe of our analysis (1995–2010) allows us to
observe market dynamics over several economic cycles. We test our hypothesis variously
using several measures of market activity within a structural panel VAR framework. Our
analysis suggests that investors’ attitude may have substantial and statistically significant
feedback effects in price determination. These results indicate noticeable asymmetry in
responses during the boom, normal and recessionary periods.
Keywords Asymmetry . Demand-supply mismatch . Panel VARmodel . Real estate
JEL Classifications C53 . C82 . E37 . R31 . R33
Introduction and Motivation
A large number of studies in the last couple of decades have made attempt to
understand the behavior of economic agents and roles those play in shaping investment
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decisions and determining market movements through their collective actions. Such
behavior under various economic environments is not straightforward to examine as
outcomes may change for different types of agents at different points of economic
cycles. While there is a robust theoretical understanding of this process, the empirical
evidence is rather thin with mixed outcomes. Therefore, our objective is to examine if
buyers and sellers behave differently when the same information is available in the
market and their asymmetric responses to returns that reflect both demand- and supply-
sides trends. We do so by analyzing various phases of upturns and downturns in
economic cycles. In this paper, we particularly focus on the real estate sector because
it provides some unique features such as market imperfections and precautionary
savings that lend support to the rational expectations permanent income hypothesis
(Hall 1978). In real estate, volume of investment tends to be lumpy and long-term
commitments are required to hold assets i.e. mortgages, debt structures. Therefore, real
estate funds hold cash as a cushion in phases of the liquidity to avoid fire sales when
property prices are falling. Furthermore, funds do not always spend according to
rational expectations and tend to retain cash to create available resources in times when
funding is not available. Finally, the distributed lag of past actual income determines a
timing mismatch between the investment decision and the deployment of money (i.e.
6–9 months trading period; see Ling et al. 2009).
Consideration of these market features in understanding how sellers and buyers
respond variously to changes in economic condition is particularly important. There-
fore, using several proxies derived from a survey of institutional investors, we explore
(and find evidence for) demand-supply mismatches and the existence of feedback
loops, which follow asymmetric patterns over the market cycle. We study several real
estate sectors over 1995–2010 and test our hypotheses variously using within a
structural panel VAR framework and analyzing impulse response functions.
We have organized the rest of the paper as follows: firstly, we discuss relevant
literature in detail, and we identify testable hypotheses within the literature; we then
describe the data and empirical framework used in this study in “Data Description” and
“Empirical Framework” sections. Finally, we present an in-depth analysis of the
empirical evidence, robustness checks and provide conclusions in the last two sections.
Relevant Literature
The primary stock market and investment psychology literature revolve around a few
strands of theoretical frameworks and empirical tests. The notion of rationality in asset
pricing and assumptions under the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) are frequently
challenged, and Hirshleifer (2001) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature.
Market scenarios may influence the association of expectations and returns, as reported in
Chiu et al. (2014), who use index and financial exchange-traded funds (ETFs) to find an
asymmetric effect on equity liquidity and investor trading behavior during the subprime
crisis period. Kumar and Lee (2006) examine whether the buy-sell activities of retail
investors contain a common directional component. In their clientele-based framework,
different investor groups operate within different natural “habitats”, i.e. have a preference
for certain groups of stocks. As a result of such preference-based trading behavior, the
returns may also reflect underlying expectations. Specifically, the authors test the
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hypothesis that “…if the buy-sell patterns of retail investors do not move in lock-step with
overall market movements, assets in market segments dominated by these investors could
be characterized by pricing anomalies that are associated with their trading activities”.
Within real estate, the RERCLLC1 reports investor attitudes each quarter. Using a survey
of institutional investors, Ling (2005) finds that the consensus opinions on investment
conditions contained in RERC survey are not useful in forecasting subsequent return
performance. Similarly, using the RERC survey and data from Korpacz PriceWaterhouse
Coopers, Clayton et al. (2009) examine the extent to which fundamentals and investor
attitudes explain the time-series variation in national-level cap rates. They find evidence that
investor attitudes impact pricing, even after controlling for changes in expected rental
growth, equity risk premiums, T-bond yields, and lagged adjustments from long-run
equilibrium. Marcato and Nanda (2016) test several real estate indexes and find that they
contain valuable information that can help predict changes in real estate returns. Nanda
(2007) analyzes predictive ability of a survey-based sentiment index in the residential
market. Das et al. (2015) looks at sentiment-induced behavior in the REIT market.
Specifically for residential markets, the marketing time (or ‘time on market’, i.e. TOM)
has been shown to be negatively related to price movements, possibly indicating that
investor’s attitudes are more optimistic in periods when properties are transacted quickly.
Benefield et al. (2014) present an overview of the literature focused on the relationship
between TOM and real estate prices, while Sirmans et al. (2010) provide a meta-analysis of
the key studies. For commercial real estate, we find very few studies and they mainly focus
on the seller’s perspective – e.g. Lin and Vandell (2007) – even though the buyer’s
perspective (market entry) also matters. Moreover, other studies suggest the need to better
define the measurement of time on market for both residential (Benefield and Hardin 2015)
and commercial markets (McNamara 1998 and Bond et al. 2004).
More recently, some studies have used data from online search engines to measure
market sentiment. Online search data may contain information about what economic
agents are interested in (see for example, Choi and Varian 2012 et al.). Hohenstatt and
Kaesbauer (2014) have shown that the sub-categories in the Google Trends tool are
more suitable than the broader search volume index.
In two recent studies, Heinig and Nanda (2018) and Heinig et al. (2020) present a
simple test for the potential of different market indicators to improve a basic cap rate
model. Using commercial real estate data for London West End, the results indicate a
considerable improvement in model accuracy. Finally, van Dijk et al. (2018) use more
refined internet search data, i.e. the number of clicks on properties listed online – to
study price and liquidity dynamics of the Dutch housing market. They construct a
market tightness indicator from internet search behavior and find this measure to
represent a good predictor of future changes in both prices and liquidity.
The above literature review suggests the possibility of an association between inves-
tors’ expectations and market returns.2 Such an association may reveal asymmetric
behaviour depending on the market structure, circumstances and economic cycles. These
possibilities motivate our testable hypotheses, as described in the following section.
1 RERC, LLC (formerly known as Real Estate Research Corporation), is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Situs. The survey, now known as the Situs RERC Real Estate Report
2 There is a more extensive literature on sentiment in mainstream economics and finance. Here we focus on
the most relevant aspects of literature.
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Theoretical Underpinning and Testable Hypotheses
We test several theoretical hypotheses building on the interactions and bargaining
behavior of buyers and sellers in the market. Buyers and sellers shape their behavior
based on ‘signal processing’ of the information set at a given point in time. The ‘signal
processing’ may vary from buyers to sellers, and it may depend on the phase of the
market cycle in which they operate. The adjustment of buyers’ and sellers’ reservation
prices may reflect such behaviors, which may also show noticeable temporal variation.
Hence, the underlying assumption behind our theoretical hypotheses is that economic
agents’ expectations inform their actions, which, in turn, lead to the potential formation
of a reservation price gap or a demand-supply mismatch. These situations are observ-
able in phases when buyers are not willing to pay high prices (in down markets), or
sellers are not willing to accept low offers (in up markets), or buyers are willing to pay
higher prices in up markets. In these circumstances, market liquidity may change along
with the trading activities and very few transactions may occur. On the other hand,
when the buyers are willing to purchase at high prices (in rising markets), and sellers
are willing to accept low offers (in falling markets), the demand-supply mismatch
might be narrower. As a result, the likelihood of an agreement between the offer and
asking prices increase, leading to a larger number of successful completions.
Based on the above research issues, we put forward two plausible reasons behind the
asymmetric patterns in agents’ responses during different phases of a market cycle:
& A Shift in Bargaining Abilities: Depending upon the phase in the cycle, the
bargaining power of sellers and buyers changes. Boom times typically reflect
sellers’ markets, tilting the balance of bargaining power to the sellers’ side with
significantly more demand than supply. On the contrary, recessionary periods are
often buyers’market with more bargaining power on buyers’ side with low demand
and sellers willing to accept lower prices in order to clear inventory.
& Long-Run Investment Commitment and Maturity Mismatch: Real estate as an
investment sector is notoriously thin in terms of liquidity and it takes significant
time on the market to sell properties. Typically, real estate investors cannot sell
properties quickly as they are locked in a long-term commitment. As a result, the
price increase during boom times may be faster than in the normal market condi-
tions. During the boom times, buyers may need to increase their reservation prices
faster if they want to access a rising market or else, they risk being outbid by other
buyers. Note, we define a normal market as one in which demand and supply
conditions are relatively in balance. On the other hand, during market downturns,
prices may not follow the same speed of adjustment. Although it is a buyers’
market, long-term commitment may cause price stickiness due to maturity mis-
match. In these market settings, sellers may need to resort to non-price discounts to
clear inventories and cut losses.
The above theoretical underpinnings require a suitable empirical framework. We argue
that the computable difference-in-difference estimator discussed in Fisher et al. (2003)
is an appropriate methodology for investigating the research questions in this paper.
They note that a transaction is observed when the reservation prices of the buyer is
higher than the seller’s reservation prices. Hence, assuming that the transaction price is
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the mid-point of the bid-ask prices, and using a probit model with transacted and non-
transacted properties, they derive two separate indices for demand and supply. The
distance between these two indices and the actual transaction price is symmetrical.
However, its size varies over time. We follow a similar approach. Specifically, we
compute a proxy for the demand-supply mismatch by taking the difference between the
demand and supply indices relative to the price index level at that time. We interpret the
difference as the Reservation Price Gap (RPG) i.e. it represents the gap between the
reservation prices of buyers and sellers:
Reservation PriceGap RPGð Þ ¼ Return on Supply Index Retsð Þ–Return on Demand Index Retdð Þ
ð1Þ
Figure 1 shows the conceptual background of this definition of the demand-supply
mismatch. The buyer and seller’s distributions overlap to show the extent of transaction
activities. The graph at the top shows a market state (A) with an overlap of the two
frequency distributions of reservation prices less pronounced than in the market state
(B) which is reflected in the graph below. It then results in the state (A) having a fewer
number of transactions. The state (A) occurs due to only a small number of buyers and
sellers being matched compared to that in the state (B) where the frequency distribu-
tions of the buyers and sellers reservation prices overlap to a greater extent (the bottom
graph).
The difference-in-differences design of the estimator enables us to identify and study
the feedback effects that are associated with a time trend and those reflecting the
asymmetry between two time periods. Similar to Fisher et al. (2003) and van Dijk









where RPGDID represents the reservation price gap computed as the difference between
the change in sellers’ reservation prices from time t to t + 1 (respectively PtS and Pt + 1S)
and the change in buyers’ reservation prices from time t to t + 1 (respectively PtB and
Pt + 1B).
It is important to note that RPG in Eq. (2) is not a simple difference between
reservation prices of the buyers and sellers. It is rather designed to capture difference in
reservation prices in two time periods (t and t + 1). Intuitively, several theoretical
relationships can emerge, which are empirically testable. The buyers and sellers’
demand-supply schedules are presented in Fig. 2, and through horizontal summation,
a two-agent market equilibrium occurs. Note that in the presence of many economic
agents, the kinks smooth out.
In Panel A, we report the original demand and supply indices, alongside the
frequency distributions of the buyers and sellers’ reservation prices that determine the
reservation price (RPG) “AB”. The point X represents the equilibrium price at the
intersection of demand and supply, which is the basis for computing return indices.
Panel B shows a symmetric response of buyers/sellers where the reservation price gap
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remains unchanged at “AB”. Finally, the remaining two graphs on the right-hand side
show the asymmetric response to a buyer’s (top) and a sellers’ (bottom) position, where
the reservation price gap narrows as the two distributions move closer to each other. In
particular, Panel C shows a situation when buyers move first towards the sellers’
reservation price points by raising their reservation prices and, the RPG measure
changes from “AB” to “CB”. Panel D instead shows a move by the sellers’ towards
RPGDID =  (RPtS - RPt-1S) - (RPtB - RPt-1B) 





































Fig. 1 Reservation Price Gap. Note: the top graph shows a wider gap between buyers and sellers’ reservation
prices. As a result, the two probability distributions overlap less and we should record a lower level of
transactions because there is less matching between buyers and sellers in the market
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the buyers’ reservation prices. If they reduce their reservation prices, the RPG measure
changes from “AB” to “AD”.
Referring to the research issues discussed earlier, we identify the main data sources
that can allow us to compute the DID estimator discussed above. A detailed data
description is provided in a separate section later. We use information on four indica-
tors i.e. marketing time, buy-sell recommendations, investment conditions and distress-
ed sale. Specifically, we build the following testable hypotheses based on these
measurable market indicators.
Hypothesis I. Time on market shorter in up market and longer in down cycles:
During an up-cycle, there are more potential buyers than sellers. The time on market
therefore tends to be shorter and it can reflect the underlying mismatch between
demand and supply. It is likely that buyers adjust their reservation prices upwards at
a rate faster than the sellers’ prices. As a result, the RPG measure (as defined in
equation-2) would narrow. In contrary, during the down cycles, the dynamics change.
Sellers generally prefer non-price discounts to a price reduction to avoid the possibility
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Fig. 2 Dynamics of Asymmetry. Note: These graphs represent symmetric (left) and asymmetric (right)
responses to a buyer and seller’s move. The initial price reservation gap (RPG) is set at AB in Panel a. Panel
b shows a symmetric response that leads to no change in RPG (still at AB). However, an asymmetric response
may cause a reduction in the RPG measure to either CB in the case of a buyer’s move (Panel c), or AD in case
of a seller’s move (Panel d)
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signal weaknesses, and the buyers could further exploit the situation by bargaining
harder for deeper price discounts that could lead to successive price cuts and a
downward price spiral. Therefore, at least initially during the down cycle, the seller’s
reservation price does not change or changes at a slow rate. Buyers, observing more
availability, may start reducing their reservation prices. As a result, the price gap
widens. However, as the recession deepens or lingers with increasing marketing time,
the sellers would also need to offer more aggressive price discounts to offload
inventories which may lead to sharper and frequent price reductions. The downward
spiraling of prices would entail a narrowing RPG.
Hypothesis II. More buy than sell recommendations in up market and more sell than
buy recommendations in down market:
More buy than sell recommendations will lead to more demand. A higher level of
investment demand will cause the demand curve to shift upwards or to the right with
respect to the supply curve. It is also likely that rising demand will entail a faster
upward adjustment to buyers’ reservation prices compared to that of the sellers.
Therefore, in up cycles, this could eventually lead to a tighter RPG. On the other hand,
there is a possibility of more sell than buy recommendations in down-cycles, leading to
changes in RPG.
Hypothesis III. Investment conditions improve in down markets:
A change in the perception of investment conditions in a rising market may lead to
adjustments in reservation prices by buyers and sellers. However, the adjustment
process can differ for buyers and sellers. Assume that investment conditions worsen
after a period of significant growth. Buyers may embed this signal more readily and
carefully than sellers because they may want to trade only when there is more assurance
that prices will not decline, especially after a long phase of growth. On the other hand,
sellers may be willing to wait longer before revising their reservation prices downwards
even if they stand to lose by not exiting immediately. It may be due to significant
accumulation of capital gains which can allow them to withstand further price cuts. The
net effect on RPG may depend on relative bargaining power. On the other hand, during
a down cycle, if investment conditions improve, a cautious optimism may prevail
among buyers and with sellers adjusting their reservation prices upward, it may lead to
a widening RPG.
Hypothesis IV. Prevalence of distressed sales during the down cycles:
Recessions and market slumps are opportune times for portfolio building at low
prices. The so-called ‘vulture’ investors exploit such possibilities through aggres-
sive buying of distressed assets. During down cycles, price expectations tend to be
revised frequently and faster than other times and sellers are often more profound-
ly affected in these scenarios. The prevalence of distressed sales would actually
increase demand for investment assets in a down cycle, where otherwise there are
not many buyers. Sellers’ reservation prices may need to fall faster to close
transactions as demand reservation prices keep falling. Therefore, the existence
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of vulture investors in a crisis tightens the RPG, compared to a situation without
these vulture investors.
The dynamics of market equilibrium would crucially depend on how buyers and
sellers move based on their own perspectives and market conditions. In aggregate, we
can visualize the changes in market equilibrium conditions by the gradual movements
(price-related) and shifts (non-price determinants) in demand and supply curves. As an
example, Fig. 3 presents a visualization of the dynamics of market equilibrium. Making
direct reference to our key hypotheses, we show changes in relation to the market
indicators.
Figure 3 presents two possibilities: the upper panel shows adjustments due to
favorable bargaining position of buyers in down markets and the lower panel shows
adjustments due to favorable bargaining position of buyers in up markets.
& Time on Market Shorter in Up Market and longer in Down Cycles
In a rising market, buyers may raise their reservation prices faster than sellers because
of their eagerness to be invested rather than holding onto cash. On the contrary, in a
falling market, we should see the reservation price gap decrease because buyers are
reducing prices faster than sellers.
& More Buy than Sell Recommendations in Up Market and More Sell than Buy
Recommendations in Down Market
Fig. 3 Indicators of demand-supply mismatch. Note: The figure represents the change in demand and supply
due to three main proxies of market expectations (investment conditions, marketing time and buy vs sell
recommendations)
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Buyers are more directly targeted by these recommendations. Therefore, a much faster
upward revision in buyers’ reservation prices than in sellers’ reservation prices can be
expected. As a result, the RPG measure narrows.
& Investment Conditions Improve in Down Markets
If investment conditions improve in terms of broader economic and financial factors in
down markets, liquidity may recover, and hence we may find a higher volume of
transactions. Increasing transaction volumes may encourage sellers to act as price-
setters as they see higher than the average number of prospective buyers per sale item
or property. This may result in widening RPG.
Next, we test the above-mentioned hypotheses with a detailed empirical analysis
based on a rich set of information on the US real estate market. We use a panel
estimation framework with four key sub-sectors (office, retail, industrial and the other)
for the variables of interest (demand and supply returns, RPG and proxies of market
expectations).
Data Description
Our analysis includes a set of indicators capturing market sentiment and standard
economic data. Specifically, we analyze several indicators from the Real Estate Re-
search Corporation (RERC) survey, along with indicators reflecting financial distress.
Our return or performance variables are based on the MIT/CRE CREDL Transactions-
Based Index (TBI) for non-residential real estate sector. The US-based firm Situs
RERC surveys hundreds of experts each quarter to gauge commercial real estate
investment trends and return expectations. Notably, they collect institutional investment
information for top 48 metros and 11 major property types in the US.
From the RERC survey, we use information for marketing time, buy-sell recom-
mendations and investment conditions. The sample period is 1995Q1 through 2010Q4.
Our data for demand and supply indices ends in 2010, as the data providers no longer
produce these indices. For further discussion on the transition from these indices to
transaction-based indices provided by NCREIF (NTBI),3 please refer to the white paper
by Geltner (2011). Even if we are not able to capture the latest information, we still
believe that the real estate market provides a suitable and robust laboratory to test the
research hypotheses that are relevant to any periods. Moreover, the time period is
sufficiently long and enables us to observe and infer from the experiences of multiple
economic cycles, including the Global Financial Crisis. As far as we are aware, no
other sectors provide both an adequate setting for testing the rational expectation
permanent income hypothesis and the availability of demand and supply indices.
A detailed definition of the variables is provided in Table 1. As there are no direct
measures of demand and supply for real estate markets, we have decided to use the
transaction-based indices (TBI) created by CREDL (the Centre of Real Estate Data
3 NCREIF is the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries and collects, processes and provides
commercial real estate indices for its members and to the benefit of the market. The new NTBI methodology
can be found here: https://www.ncreif.org/data-products/tbi/.
G. Marcato, A. Nanda
Laboratory at MIT) as proxies for demand-supply imbalances.4 Along with the TBI for
real estate assets, CREDL also publishes a constant-liquidity price index capturing two
dimensions of market functionality from the asset owners’ perspective, price and
expected time-on-the-market, which are then combined into a single dimension,
liquidity-adjusted price. This measure represents price movements, with holding the
expected time on the market constant, i.e. liquidity. Mainly, the demand index reflects
buyers’ responses, thus driving the constant-liquidity values. The supply index repre-
sents prices required to maintain a constant ‘ease of selling’. As reported above, these
indices have been computed and made available only until the end of 2010.
As the sample period covers 1995Q1 to 2010Q4, we acknowledge the need for
extending the analysis to a period beyond 2010 in order to include more up to date
information. The MIT Property Price Dynamics Platform5 now publishes regional
supply and demand indices from 2005. The period 2005 to 2010 represents the
overlapping period of our sample with the newly constructed demand and supply
indices provided by van Dijk et al. (2018, unpublished working paper). Contrary to
Fisher et al. (2007) in terms of the methodology, the new indices are estimated only
using repeat sales (i.e. properties transacted at least twice during the sample period).
Therefore, considering the economic shock during this period due to the Global
4 The MIT/CRE CREDL Transactions-Based Index are available at - http://web.mit.edu/cre/research/credl/tbi.
html
Table 1 Variable description
Variable Description Source
Real state returns
Ret Transaction-Based Index (TBI) return MIT/CRE Commercial Real Estate Data Laboratory
Retd Transaction-Based Demand Index return MIT/CRE Commercial Real Estate Data Laboratory
Rets Transaction-Based Supply Index return MIT/CRE Commercial Real Estate Data Laboratory
Economic/financial variables
GDPR Real Gross Domestic Product growth rate Thomson Reuters Datastream
CPI Consumer Price Index growth rate Thomson Reuters Datastream
INT10Y 10- year Treasury bond yield Thomson Reuters Datastream
INT03M 3-month Treasury bill rate Thomson Reuters Datastream
Other variables
TOM Time to Market (to sell a property) Situs RERC (Real Estate Research Corporation)
BUYSELL Ratio of buy vs. sell responses Situs RERC (Real Estate Research Corporation)
INVCOND Surveyed market investment conditions Situs RERC (Real Estate Research Corporation)
DELIQ Delinquency on commercial real estate loans Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), St. Louis Fed
DELIQ_RE Delinquency on overall real estate loans Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), St. Louis Fed
This table reports the main sources and description of the variables used in our study. Particularly, TOM
represents the marketing time required to sell a property, buy-sell computes a ratio of the recommendation to
either buy or sell indicating the outlook on the next 6–12 months; invcond reflects the expectations of
investment conditions in the market over next 6–12 months; DELIQ and DELIQ_RE represent the delin-
quency rate of respectively commercial real estate loans (excluding farmland) and overall real estate loans
(including housing)
5 Source: http://pricedynamicsplatform.mit.edu/analytics.html.
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Financial Crisis, the characteristics of properties transacted more than once may differ
from the ones that were transacted less often. The underlying sample of transacted
properties in the MIT/CREDL indices that we use in our paper is larger than the one
used by the newly constructed repeat-sales version. Furthermore, the new repeat sales
indices are computed by city and then area (East, West, Midwest and South). To obtain
a national average and to compare it with the MIT/CRE CREDL indices, we compute
an equally weighted average of the RPG measure of the four areas. We then explore the
possibility of extending the data series with these new indices, bearing in mind that
these indices are regional and based on a different set of data. Firstly, three out of four
property types are represented as industrial sector is not covered by the new series.
Moreover, we correlate the new RPG measure derived from the new demand and
supply indexes with the one used in our analysis. Similar to the focus of our paper, we
compare up and down cycles and we find that our measure based on the MIT/CREDL
indices is highly correlated (almost 83%) with the RPG using new indices based on
repeat-sales method. Moreover, our sample covers a long period, and it allows us to
explore up and down cycles not only around the most recent crisis in 2008 but also in
the 1990s. Therefore, we do not think, our analysis suffers significantly from the lack of
recent data.
Situs RERC tracks investment conditions, marketing time and buy/sell/hold recom-
mendations across 11 property types and publish a quarterly Real Estate Report. This
dataset is aggregated at the national level from the RERC’s quarterly institutional
survey responses obtained from real estate institutional players, such as REITs, pension
funds, insurance companies, banks, and opportunity funds.6 Particularly, investment
conditions represent a ranking of current investment desirability (rated on a scale of 1 to
10, with 1 being low/weak and 10 being high/strong) of 11 property types for the US
institutional real estate market. According to RERC, the scale refers to the factors
affecting the market at the current time that an investor would need to consider before
investing in the property. Such factors include availability of capital for investing in
properties, price of properties, availability of properties for purchase and expected
returns. The measure of investor attitude captures the ratio of investors with
optimistic view about investment opportunities relative to those who show a less
optimistic market outlook. For a further description and use of the RERC data, see
Ling et al. (2014) for an assessment of investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage in
private real estate markets.
Furthermore, the marketing time (or, time on market i.e. TOM) represents the time
needed to market a property in a specific sector. It is measured in average number of
months and defined over the period between offering of a property for sale and securing
a bona fide buyer. In our context, TOM is used as a measure of investor attitude. A
higher TOM reveals a difficulty in finding a counterparty for the deal (as it takes more
time to market the asset), while a reduction in TOM would reflect a buoyant market
where it is easier to find counterparties and close transactions.
In addition, buy/sell/hold recommendations represent a rating that indicates whether
it is a good time to buy, sell, or hold commercial real estate within a mixed-asset
portfolio context. The ratings are on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being a ‘poor’ time to
6 For details, see Situs RERC Real Estate Report data - http://store.rerc.com/collections/historical-research-
data
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buy, sell, or hold, and 10 is an ‘excellent’ time to buy, sell, or hold. In our analysis, we
use a metric with the number of buy recommendation minus the number of sell
recommendations to capture the direction as well as the extent of opposing views. A
higher value of buy-to-sell recommendations (driven by an increase in buy intentions
relatively to sell intentions) indicates an improvement in market conditions, while a
reduction in the ratio would reflect worsening conditions and weakening of investment
intentions.
Finally, with respect to financial distress, we use seasonally adjusted delin-
quency rates of commercial real estate (excluding farmland) loans booked in









































































































































































































Buy to Sell Delinquency
a
b
Fig. 4 Transaction Based Indexes and Delinquency Rate. Panel a: Transaction Based Indexes, Panel b:
Investor Attitudes and Delinquency Rate. Note: The graph reports demand and supply indexes, as well as an
index for the equilibrium price. The difference between supply and demand indexes reveals the reservation
price gap we observe in the market. The change in this measure represents the key variable used in our study.
Note: Investment Conditions (LHS), Time on Market (i.e. TOM, LHS) and Buy to Sell recommendations
(RHS) are taken from the RERC survey. The delinquency rate of commercial real estate loans (RHS) is
obtained from the database FRED provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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database FRED provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.7 As a
robustness check, we also use delinquency rates of the overall real estate market
(including housing) from the same source (DELIQ_RE), and our results are
consistent.
Figure 4 presents price index and changes in the level of financial distress over time.
In Panel A, varying nature of the gap between demand and supply indices shows
potential demand-supply mismatch. Note that the mismatch starts to exacerbate towards
the end of the recession in the early 1990s until 1996. The extent of mismatch
fluctuated for a few years, with a slight drop at the beginning of the 2000s i.e. the
dotcom bust, and it then recovered to the highest levels of the end 1990s and also,
starting from 2003 until the beginning of 2008 economic downturn. Interestingly, the
mismatch peaked in the third quarter of 2005, suggesting that some signals of an
impending economic downturn could have been picked up by looking at the funda-
mentals behind the price escalation.
Panel B shows our key variables of interest i.e. indicators for investor attitudes and
the delinquency rate. Particularly, we see that investment conditions started to deteri-
orate at the beginning of 2007 until the third quarter of 2009. Correspondingly, the
average perceived time to execute transactions (TOM) started to rise from about less
than 6 months in 2007 to a peak of more than 9 months towards the end of 2009. Buy
to sell recommendations show a similar pattern to other two measures of investor
attitude. Finally, the level of financial distress in commercial real estate remained low
throughout the period until the financial crisis.
Empirical Framework
Our empirical framework for testing the causal relationships between returns and
demand-supply mismatch is based on the Auto-regressive Distributed Lag method -
ARDL(p,q). We pool observations from three real estate sub-sectors over time to
estimate a panel VAR model with no prior assumptions on potential causality. A
structural panel VAR representation (see Wooldridge 2010) is represented as follows:
yit ¼ a10 þ β11xit þ φ11yit−1 þ φ12xit−1 þ vyit ð3aÞ
xit ¼ a20 þ β21yit þ φ21yit−1 þ φ22xit−1 þ vyit ð3bÞ
where i refers to the industry sector and t refers to the quarters. In Eqs. (3a) and (3b),
both {yit} and {xit} are assumed to be stationary, and the error terms are white-noise
disturbances. We use a number of standard tests to choose an appropriate lag length
(e.g. Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC)).
The assumption of stationarity in Eqs. 3a and 3b can be easily violated in most
economic relationships. Specifically, we test for the existence of error correction
processes, where the short-run change in a variable is associated with both the change
in a determinant variable and the difference between the variables in the previous
7 Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
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period, i.e. the lagged disequilibrium. To validate this approach, we conduct detailed
tests for time series properties of the variables. In particular, we conduct the standard
tests of stationarity and co-integration using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Peron (PP) tests, as well as Levin et al. (2002) test for common unit roots as
we deal with panel data. As all endogenous variables (e.g. RPG and the four investors’
attitude proxies) are stationary, i.e. of order I(0), we choose a structural vector
autoregressive (VAR) over a vector error correction model (VECM).
Full development of the VAR system of equations is as follows:
Retit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jReti;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jAtti;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk;t þ εRetit ð4aÞ
Attit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jReti;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jAtti;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk;t þ εAttit ð4bÞ
Where Reti,t-j are the total returns in market equilibrium (i.e. considering marker-
clearing prices in arm’s length transactions). Atti,t-j is the proxy for market attitude.
Controlk refers to the macroeconomic and financial control variables such as real GDP
growth, inflation, interest rates, term structure and credit spread.
Furthermore, we test for the differences between buyer’s and seller’s responses to
changes in the market conditions. We use three alternative pricing measures for the test,
namely the return price gap (RPGi,t-j), demand-side and supply-side returns (Retdi,t-j and
Retsi,t-j respectively). These are noted in columns 1 to 3 in tables within the main results
section. For parsimony, we report the estimates from the first equation in the VAR
system for each pricing measure as follows:
RPGit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRPGi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jAtti;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk;t þ εRPGit ð5aÞ
Retdit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetdi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jAtti;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk;t þ εRetdit ð5bÞ
Retsit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetsi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jAtti;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk;t þ εRetsit ð5cÞ
In particular, we use four different proxies for market attitude (Atti,t-j): buy-sell recom-
mendations (BUYSELLit), marketing time (TOMit), investment conditions (INVCONDit)
and delinquency rates of commercial real estate (DELIQit). Therefore, each previous
equations is estimated for all four market attitude measures.
Therefore, we first report the estimates of the following equations for buy-sell
recommendations:
RPGit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRPGi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jBUYSELLi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRPGit ð6aÞ
Retdit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetdi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jBUYSELLi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRetdit ð6bÞ
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Retsit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetsi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jBUYSELLi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRetsit ð6cÞ
We then report the estimates of the following equations for testing the hypothesis on
marketing time:
RPGit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRPGi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jmarketingtimei;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRPGit ð7aÞ
Retdit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetdi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jmarketingtimei;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk
þ εRetdit ð7bÞ
Retsit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetsi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jmarketingtimei;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRetsit ð7cÞ
Next, we report the estimates of the following equations to examine the investment
conditions:
RPGit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRPGi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jinvcondi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRPGit ð8aÞ
Retdit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetdi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jinvcondi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRetdit ð8bÞ
Retsit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetsi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jinvcondi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRetsit ð8cÞ
Finally, we report the estimates of the following equations to analyze distressed market
scenario using the delinquency rate:
RPGit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRPGi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jdeliqi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRPGit ð9aÞ
Retdit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetdi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jdeliqi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRetdit ð9bÞ
Retsit ¼ αþ ∑nj¼1β jRetsi;t− j þ ∑nj¼1γ jdeliqi;t− j þ ∑pk¼1λkControlk þ εRetsit ð9cÞ
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A key concern in using the proxy variables for attitude is the possibility of presence of
omitted variable bias. The proxy variables contain two components – one that depends
on the fundamental return drivers because the measures tend to be highly correlated
with the standard economic measures and those may also correlate with the unobserv-
ables. The second component may capture the element that does not correlate with the
standard measures of economic fundamentals. Therefore, we use a two-stage proce-
dure, where we orthogonalize all proxies against a set of standard macroeconomic
indicators in step 1. We then use the residuals of the first stage equation of the panel
VARs in step 2 to derive the element driven by the investor’s attitude and test its effects
on pricing and demand-supply mismatch. This is suggested by Ling et al. (2015) and
Marcato and Nanda (2016). For this purpose, we use several common macroeconomic
variables such as real GDP growth rate (GDPRt), changes in the consumer price index
(inflt), the real interest rate (rintt, 10-year treasury bond yield net of inflation), the term
spread (TSt, computed as the difference between 10-year Treasury bond yield and 3-
month T-bill rate) and the credit spread (CredSprt, yield difference between AAA- and
BBB- rated bonds).
Attt ¼ αþ β1GDPRt þ β2inflt þ β3rintt þ β4TSt þ β5CredSprt þ εt ð10Þ
Where Attt is with the proxy for four measures presented above i.e. investment
conditions, marketing time, buy/hold/sell recommendations and financial distress.
Macroeconomic variables are also included as the exogenous variables within the panel
VAR framework in stage 2. Note that, they are perfectly orthogonal to other attitude-
driven elements obtained as residuals from the estimation of the model in stage 1 and
reported in the main VAR systems as Atti,t-j.
Finally, as buyers’ and sellers’ behavior may vary over the cycle, we interact down and
up cycle dummies with market attitude indicators. For the down cycles, we identify
recession periods according to the definition adopted by the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER): the down cycle dummy takes a value of 1 when a sector return reflects
negative change for two consecutive quarters. Similarly, the upcycle dummy takes a value
equal to 1 when a market return reflects positive rolling annual growth over and above
average + 1 standard deviation. We find that down and up cycles cover around 23% and
25% of the overall sample period respectively (please also refer to Table 2 for descriptive
statistics). For the remaining times, markets are considered ‘stable’ or ‘normal’.
Results and Analysis
Main Results
We first test for stationarity with ADF and PP tests and perform standard Granger
causality tests. These tests confirm stationarity of our RPG measure and market attitude
variables in levels: marketing time, buy-sell recommendations, investment conditions
and financial distress level. Furthermore, as we work with a panel dataset, we also
perform a Levin et al. (2002) test and we do not find a common unit root in our data.
Therefore, we choose a VAR over a VECM) estimation.
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Table 2 presents summary statistics of all variables. By construction, we
compute the RPG measure with a difference-in-difference design, which refers
to a change in the reservation price gap. Therefore, we find that RPG has both
positive and negative changes that cancel out each other (i.e. a mean value of
zero) for the overall property sector during 1995Q1-2010Q4. Furthermore, the
marketing time is on average just below 7 months. It varies between 4.2 and
10.5. The buy recommendations dominate the number of sell recommendations
on average, and the investment conditions vary between 2.7 and 7.4 (on a scale
of 10), with an average of 5.8. The two definitions of delinquency for com-
mercial and overall real estate markets show similar time-series patterns. There-
fore, we expect comparable results of these from the estimation models. The
dummy variables indicating up and down cycles reveal that the market has
experienced a down cycle for almost 23% of the time in our sample period,
compared with about 25% for up cycles. The remaining 52% represents periods
of relative market stability or, ‘normal’ conditions. With regard to the differ-
ence between property types, the retail real estate sub-sector shows the highest
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Skewness Kurtosis Jarque Bera Pro b.
Ret 0.01 0.05 0.20 −0.18 −0.21 5.76 71.71 0.0000
Retd 0.01 0.07 0.27 −0.25 0.27 4.92 36.65 0.0000
Rets 0.01 0.06 0.25 −0.16 00.18 5.35 52.03 0.0000
RPG 0.00 0.07 0.23 −0.21 0.16 4.73 28.45 0.0000
TOM 6.76 1.18 10.50 4.20 0.54 3.24 11.38 0.0034
BUYSELL 2.02 2.32 13.00 0.00 2.16 8.15 416.24 0.0000
INVCOND 5.76 0.86 7.40 2.70 −0.73 3.75 24.98 0.0000
DELIQ 0.02 0.11 0.40 −0.14 1.28 4.63 85.16 0.0000
DELIQ_RE 0.03 0.11 0.33 −0.14 0.92 3.21 31.28 0.0000
GDPR 0.01 0.01 0.02 −0.02 −1.30 6.41 168.89 0.0000
CPI 0.01 0.01 0.02 −0.02 −2.48 13.38 1219.44 0.0000
INT)#M 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.00 −0.15 1.51 21.33 0.0000
INT10Y 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.17 2.39 4.47 0.1068
Dummies
UP_ALL 0.25 0.43 1 0 1.18 2.40 14.14 0.0009
UP_IND 0.18 0.38 1 0 1.17 3.91 29.65 0.0000
UP_OFF 0.28 0.45 1 0 0.98 1.95 11.66 0.0029
UP_RET 0.21 0.41 1 0 1.42 3.02 19.16 0.0001
DOWN_ALL 0.23 0.42 1 0 1.30 2.68 16.20 0.0003
DOWN_IND 0.18 0.38 1 0 1.71 3.91 29.65 0.0000
DOWN_OFF 0.19 0.40 1 0 1.56 3.42 23.42 0.0000
DOWN_RET 0.28 0.45 1 0 0.98 1.95 11.66 0.0029
Sector-specific indexes are used to estimate panel models. Returns, RPG, market attitude measures and
dummies are all sector-specific
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proportion of down cycle (28%), compared with office (19%) and industrial
(18%) sub-sectors. On the other hand, the office sub-sector has experienced the
highest proportion of up cycles (28%), compared with retail (21%) and indus-
trial (18%).
Results to Test Hypothesis I: Marketing time as a signal of demand-supply
mismatch Table 3 presents model estimations using marketing time as an
indicator of market expectations. Columns 1 and 2 present results for respective
demand- and supply-side returns, while column 3 reports results with the RPG
measure. We follow the same structure for other three indicators in Tables 4, 5
and 6.
The model specifications include several macro-economic indicators such as
real GDP growth rate, changes in the consumer price index, the real interest
rate (10-year Treasury bond yield net of inflation), the term spread (the
difference between 10-year Treasury bond yield and 3-month T-bill rate) and
the marketing time variable along with its up cycle and down cycle dummy
interaction terms. In Panel B, we find that the marketing time over the full
cycle shows no significant feedback effect on any of the performance measures.
Although sellers might offer non-price discounts, buyers may choose to wait for
more availability. However, when the marketing time variable is interacted with
the up and down cycle dummy variables, we find remarkable patterns emerging
with a more significant results starting to appear. Specifically, during the up
cycle, marketing time leads to a weakly significant (at 10% level) negative
impact on the RPG measure, i.e. the price gap narrows, which is mainly caused
by a positive impact on the demand-side return. It can be argued that contrary
to the hypothesized case of widening RPG, if marketing time becomes longer
during the up cycle, then sellers may initially resort to some non-price dis-
counts (e.g. favorable investment and lease terms) to sell off the inventory
quicker, instead of lowering the prices. However, buyers in an up cycle may
still be willing to raise their reservation prices to be able to deploy their cash
sooner and cease the opportunity for a superior market performance. Therefore,
the buyers’ distribution moves to right (refer to Fig. 1), while the sellers’
distribution stays put. The net effect is a narrower price gap (−0.0204 over
four quarters). It is important to note that we do not find any evidence of
reverse causality.
On the contrary, when we look through the down cycles with a longer than
usual marketing time, we find a significant negative coefficient for the supply
index, suggesting that a longer marketing time during down markets may
indicate slower new supply and faster inventory accumulation. In other words,
sellers may have to offer lower prices, possibly also combined with non-price
discounts, to offload their fast-accumulating inventory in a phase where prices
are rapidly falling. It may lead them to pre-empt even further potential losses.
At the same time, buyers may simply choose to stay put with no change in
their reservation prices. The effect on RPG, albeit negative, is not significant as
the downward adjustment in reservation prices by sellers would narrow the
price gap. This argument is in line with Lizieri et al. (2012). They note that
buyers dominate falling markets because sellers show more urgency to complete
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the transactions sooner with the best possible price to exit a falling market (i.e.
sellers would otherwise see part of their capital gains shrinking). Particularly,
we shed light upon the fact that, under such circumstances, sellers may need to







Panel A: Constant and autoregressive coeffiencients (t-stats in italic)
Constant −0.0152* −0.0121* 0.0203***
t-stat −1.9177 −1.7783 2.4974
GDPR 0.7546 1.1996** −0.1527
t-stat 1.0900 2.0352 −0.2286
CPI 3.8266** 3.4288*** −1.8334
t-stat 3.3338 3.5398 −1.7766
D (INT10Y-CPI) 2.0904*** 2.5377*** 0.1832
t-stat 2.7754 4.0099 0.2691
D(INT_TERM) −3.9824*** −2.3786*** 1.2225
t-stat −3.7613 −2.6212 1.2870
D(CREDSPR) 0.0354** 0.0638*** 0.0204
t-stat 1.9726 −2.6212 1.3196
AR(1) −0.0125 −0.1160 −0.0872
t-stat −0.1721 −1.5902 −1.1531
AR(2) −0.1622*** −0.0250 −0.5482***
t-stat −2.3232 −0.3174 −7.3997
AR(3) 0.0720 0.0954 −0.1135
t-stat 0.9958 1.3171 −1.4860
AR(4) 0.1551** 0.1424 0.0475
t-stat 2.1063 1.9860 0.6459
Panel B: Sum of 4 quarterly coefficients *p value of Granger-causality Wald test in italics)
TOM 0.0104 0.0152 −0.0042
p value 0.4213 0.7776 0.2806
TOM* UP 0.0329* 0.0112 −0.0204*
p value 0.0980 0.8498 0.0866
TOM* DOWN 0.0053 −0.0175* −0.0423
p value 0.6175 0.0137 0.1129
Panel C: Overall statistics
F-statistics 3.17 2.90 6.11
Adj. R-squared 0.18 0.16 0.34
Akaike AIC −2.67 −2.77 −2.77
Schwarz SC −2.33 −2.61 −2.42
Results are obtained from the estimation of Eqs. 6a to 6c, which report the return equations. Sector-specific
price gap and marketing time (TOM) measures are used in a panel VAR with four quarterly lags. As our
variable of interest is TOM, Panel B reports the Granger-causality Wald test for the 4 lags jointly. Panel C
includes the main overall statistics of the models
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revise their reservation prices downwards. As previously hypothesized, we find
asymmetric responses of the buyers and sellers in the up and down cycles when
we use marketing time as a proxy for market expectation.
The accumulated impulse response functions (IRFs) in Fig. 5 show that the effect is
weakly significant from quarter 4 in up markets (i.e. confirming the 4 joint lags
significance in Table 3) and turns significant at the 95% confidence level in quarter 4
in down markets.
Results to Test Hypothesis II: Buy-sell recommendations as a signal of demand-supply
gap Next, we turn to the analysis of demand-supply mismatches by using buy-sell
recommendations from the RERC survey. Table 4 presents the models using a
ratio of the buy and sell recommendations as an indicator of market expectations.
If the ratio is larger than 1, then there is more buy than sell recommendations,
while a ratio of less than 1 indicates prevalence of sell recommendations. We
follow the same reporting structure as in Table 3. We mainly focus on the results
for the two phases (up and down) of cycles. We do not find any evidence of
reverse causality.
During the up cycle, there is a significant negative impact on the RPG, which
changes in sign to a significant positive effect during the down cycles. The effect sizes
are −0.2606 and 0.1592, respectively. During the up market, buyers are willing to
increase their reservation prices (i.e. towards right in Fig. 1) to be able to access a well-
performing market. On the other hand, sellers may not need to change their reservation
prices, as there is a larger number of willing buyers. The long-term commitments of
institutional investors may be a factor in them not being able to revise their reservation
prices. Due to a higher level of willingness to revise their reservation prices by buyers,
the net effect on RPG is negative, i.e. the gap narrows, leading to a larger number of
completions of transactions.
On the contrary, during the down cycle, buyers may lower their reservation prices
faster than sellers as sellers may consider a combination of non-price and price
discounts, instead of assorting to price discounts straightway. Consequently, the gap
(RPG) may widen, leading to less frequency and likelihood for completions, which, in
turn, could lead to a supply overhang.
Fig. 5 Accumulated impulse response functions (IRFs) of the reservation price gap (RPG) in up and down
markets. Note: The graphs contain the accumulated IRFs of the RPG to innovations of marketing time in up
(left) and down (right) markets. The two dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval
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Panel A: Constant and autoregressive coeffiencients (t-stats in italic)
Constant −0.0125 −0.0120 0.0124
t-stat −1.2033 −1.2006 1.1212
GDPR 0.4330 1.3652** −0.0020
t-stat 0.5734 1.9805 −0.0026
CPI 3.8973*** 3.0622*** −1.1552
t-stat 2.5849 2.2689 −0.7829
D(INT10Y-CPI) 1.4531* 2.1203*** 0.9413
t-stat 1.7586 2.8582 1.1666
D(INT_TERM) −3.8064*** −2.0454*** 1.0237
t-stat −3.9276 −2.3842 1.0929
D(CREDSPR) 0.0345** 0.0432*** 0.0113
t-stat 1.9789 2.7419 0.6787
AR(1) 0.0067 −0.0520 0.0235
t-stat 0.0963 −0.7684 0.3493
AR(2) −0.1727*** −0.0379 −0.446***
t-stat −2.6990 −0.5383 −7.0347
AR(3) 0.1054 0.0921 0.0005
t-stat 1.6405 1.2982 0.0071
AR(4) 0.117* 0.1261* 0.1508***
t-stat 1.7821 1.7978 2.2940
Panel B: Sum of 4 quarterly coeffiecients (p value of Granger-causality Wald test in italics)
BUYSELL 0.1042 0.0519 −0.0767
p value 0.2991 0.6782 0.1208
BUYSELL * UP 0.2635 −0.1154 −0.2606
p value 0.1970 0.3183 0.0353
BUYSELL * DOWN −0.0305 −0.0008 0.1592*
p value 0.0349 0.6816 0.0961
Panel C: Overall statisticsReturn
F-statistic 4.53 2.35 7.27
Adj. R-squared 0.24 0.11 0.36
Akaike AIC −2.76 −2.95 −2.76
Schwarz SC −2.44 −2.63 −2.44
Results are obtained from the estimation of Eqs. 7a to 7c. Sector-specific price gap and buy vs sell
recommendations (BUYSELL) measures are used in a panel VAR with four quarterly lags. As our variable
of interest is BUYSELL, Panel B reports the Granger-causality Wald test for the 4 lags jointly. Panel C includes
the main overall statistics of the models
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Figure 6 shows the accumulated IRFs in up (left) and down markets, where buy/sell
recommendations respectively show their impact from quarter 4 to 8 in rising markets
and those tend to be weakly significant around the same period when markets fall.
Results to Test Hypothesis III: Investment conditions as a market indicator Investment
conditions, as revealed by the RERC survey respondents, can serve as an
important indicator of market expectations. We find a significant difference in
the feedback effects of investment conditions during up and down cycles.
While the effect of an improvement in investment conditions is positive in
both cycles, it is not substantial and significant in the up cycles. However, it is
significant in the down cycles. It is plausible that investment conditions can
improve in a downturn due to interventions by the Central Banks and other
Government agencies for example, monetary policy interventions such as rate
cuts, quantitative easing and also, fiscal policy measures that can elevate market
expectation and open up new channels of investments in the economy. As
investment conditions improve, liquidity in the market improves and, therefore,
we may expect to find a larger volume of transactions. Increasing transaction
volumes may encourage sellers to act as price-setters as they see a higher than
the average number of prospective buyers per sale item or property. When the
investment conditions worsen after a period of significant growth, buyers may
consider this signal more readily than sellers and attempt to take advantage of
the situation. Buyers would exercise cautious optimism, bargain harder, and
they may only want to participate if they are guaranteed a price drop, especially
after a long period of growth. Moreover, we do not find any evidence of
reverse causality.
On the other hand, sellers may exercise more patience and be willing to wait
longer before starting to revise their reservation prices downwards. Even if
sellers stand to lose further by not exiting the market soon enough, they may
still be prepared to face a higher risk of price-cuts. It may be due to the fact
that they have either accumulated significant capital gains in the preceding
growth period or, they cannot realize the financial losses on their books for
the current period or, both. Our results for the down cycles confirm such
Fig. 6 Accumulated impulse response functions (IRFs) of the reservation price gap (RPG) in up and down
markets. Note: The graphs contain the accumulated IRFs of the RPG to innovations of buy/sell recommen-
dations in up (left) and down (right) markets. The two dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval
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Panel A: Constant and autoregressive coeffiencients (t-stats in italics)
Constant −0.0153 −0.0034 0.0224***
t-stat −1.6200 −0.3893 2.2951
GDPR 0.4248 1.0925* −0.3764
t-stat 0.6204 1.8400 −0.5310
CPI 3.3777*** 2.1376*** −1.5805
t-stat 2.9283 2.1265 −1.3742
D(INT10Y-CPI) 2.0294*** 1.8846*** −0.0817
t-stat 2.8696 3.0872 −0.1146
D(INT_TERM) −5.1128*** −2.3518*** 2.7434***
t-stat −4.9755 −2.6803 2.7034
D(CREDSPR) 0.0226 0.0452*** 0.0176
t-stat 1.2898 3.0029 1.0063
AR(1) 0.0130 −0.0668 −0.0170
t-stat 0.1999 −0.9377 −0.2535
AR(2) −0.171*** −0.0509 −0.5399***
t-stat −2.6933 −0.6974 −8.1622
AR(3) 0.1028 0.0474 −0.0431
t-stat 1.5913 0.6346 −0.6296
AR(4) 0.1139* 0.134* 0.0244
t-stat 1.6922 1.7725 0.3541
Panel B: Sum of 4 quarterly coeffiecients (p value of Granger-causality Wald test in italics)
INVCOND 0.0334 −0.0020 −0.0454*
p value 0.1766 0.7060 0.0645
INVCOND * UP −0.0197 −0.0148 0.0341
p value 0.7123 0.6513 0.2084
INVCOND * DOWN −0.0503* 0.0234 0.1006***
p value 0.0953 0.9197 0.0009
Panel C: Overall statisticsReturn
F-statistic 3.58 2.28 6.20
Adj. R-squared 0.18 0.10 0.30
Akaike AIC −2.73 −2.99 −2.72
Schwarz SCPanel −2.43 −2.68 −2.42
Results are obtained from the estimation of Eqs. 8a to 8c. Sector-specific price gap and investment conditions
(INVCOND) measures are used in a panel VAR with four quarterly lags. As our variable of interest is
INVCOND, Panel B reports the Granger-causality Wald test for the 4 lags jointly. Panel C includes the main
overall statistics of the models
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behavior with the sellers’ return not being significant and, the buyers’ return is
negative with an overall widening of RPG, as the buyers’ distribution move to
the left.
In Fig. 7 accumulated IRFs show no significance in up markets, while some
significance is found in down markets around quarter 4, but it subsequently
fades away.
Results to test Hypothesis IV: Presence of ‘vulture’ investors during down cycles The
distressed market conditions provide a unique opportunity for investors to
accumulate assets and build portfolios at relatively very low prices. Particularly,
there is ample evidence of ‘vulture’ investing in real estate markets, especially
in post-GFC periods. ‘Vulture’ investors follow a very different strategy than
typical investors do and thus, they may defy standard market predictions. Their
strategy of ‘picking from the ruins’ is quite contrary to other typical investors’
strategies, and this may further exacerbate the market frictions. We test such
possibility in Table 6, where we use a delinquency measure as a proxy for the
prevalence of distressed asset sales.
Since delinquency is particularly prevalent in down cycles, the results for up
cycles are not significant and those are not quite relevant either. This is
expected due to presence of ‘vulture’ investors, and distress sales only become
significant during deep recessionary periods. During such times, buyers act as
price-setters and sellers must accept a lot lower bargaining power, especially if
they hold distressed assets. We find that delinquency affects sellers directly,
thus forcing them to lower their reservation prices much faster than the buyers,
to be able to meet debt obligations. Buyers also revise their reservation prices
downward during down cycles, but the rate at which they revise it is much
slower than that of sellers’. As a result, with much faster downward revision in
seller’s return – i.e. leftward movement in sellers’ distribution in Fig. 1 – the
RPG measure may narrow significantly during down cycles, leading to statis-
tically significant compression of −0.2434 in RPG. The coefficient is negative
for both sellers and buyers. As the distress level deepens (i.e. the volume of
Fig. 7 Accumulated impulse response functions (IRFs) of the reservation price gap (RPG) in up and down
markets. Note: The graphs contain the accumulated IRFs of the RPG to innovations of investment conditions
in up (left) and down (right) markets. The two dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval
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Panel A: Constant and autoregressive coeffiencients (t-stats in italics)
Constant −0.0152 0.0013 0.0232***
t-stat −1.6064 0.1548 2.5085
GDPR 1.0678 0.1891 −1.1917
t-stat 1.3490 0.2704 −1.5254
CPI 4.107*** 2.5445*** −2.8673***
t-stat 3.3618 2.3853 −2.4408
D(INT10Y-CPI) 0.7996 3.5075*** 1.7998**
t-stat 0.8902 4.4932 2.1082
D(INT_TERM) −1.5729 −2.6718*** −1.2061
t-stat −1.5578 −3.0420 −1.2061
D(CREDSPR) 0.0124 0.0694*** 0.0423***
t-stat 0.5950 3.7718 2.2058
AR(1) −0.0115 −0.0856 −0.0480
t-stat −0.1738 −1.3134 −0.7613
AR(2) −0.1331** −0.0647 −0.4254***
t-stat −2.1169 −0.9751 −6.9614
AR(3) 0.1148* 0.0146 −0.0070
t-stat 1.8380 0.2307 −0.1167
AR(4) 0.1289** 0.0622 0.1013*
t-stat 0.1289** 0.9829 1.7024
Panel B: Sum of 4 quarterly coeffiecients (p value of Granger-causality Wald test in italics)
DELIQ 0.0119 −0.0057 0.0038
p value 0.3736 0.3476 0.1606
DELIQ * UP −0.1738 0.0912 0.2654
p value 0.4048 0.2554 0.4425
DELIQ * DOWN −0.3702* −0.7247*** −0.2434***
p value 0.0692 0.0000 0.0000
Panel C: Overall statisticsReturn
F-statistic 4.98 3.43 8.75
Adj. R-squared 0.25 0.17 0.39
Akaike AIC −2.83 −3.07 −2.86
Schwarz SC −2.52 −2.76 −2.55
Results are obtained from the estimation of Eqs. 9a to 9c. Sector-specific price gap and delinquency rate
(DELIQ) measures are used in a panel VAR with four quarterly lags. As our variable of interest is DELIQ,
Panel B reports the Granger-causality Wald test for the 4 lags jointly. Panel C includes the main overall
statistics of the models
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distress properties for sale goes up), the downward revision in the reservation
prices becomes faster. However, such reductions are much sharper for sellers
than for buyers. Moreover, a narrowing price gap may bring some liquidity if
sellers need to reduce their inventories.
Figure 8 reports the accumulated IRFs, which confirm our aforementioned
results showing strong significance of delinquency rates as opportunities for
vulture investors materialize in down markets where the gap is significantly
reduced from quarter 4 for a relatively long period (almost 3 years).
Overall, the results from all four tables reflect clear evidence of bargaining
in the market. Such bargaining activities behave differently in recessionary
periods compared to from other times in the economic cycle. Our empirical
results indicate strong evidence of price adjustments and more importantly, they
reflect asymmetry in price movements during various phases of economic
cycles. These results are consistent with our theoretical hypotheses described
in “Theoretical Underpinning and Testable Hypotheses” section. Our analysis
suggests that buyers’ or sellers’ attitude and resultant revisions in their reser-
vation prices lead to strong and statistically significant feedback effects in price
determination. The results are robust when we pool information from all three
sub-sectors (which are available upon request). Our results support the possi-
bility of asymmetric responses during the boom, normal and recessionary
periods.
Feedback Loops and the Impact of Pricing on Investors’ Attitudes
As a further step in our analysis, we present the impulse response functions of
investors’ attitudes to price changes. In fact, there may be a feedback loop
where investors read into the pricing mechanism and adjust their expectations.
Figure 9 presents IRFs derived from the second equation of our VAR models
assessing RPG for four different proxies of investors’ attitudes. We find that
the strongest feedback loop is found for both buy/sell recommendations (Panel
Fig. 8 Accumulated impulse response functions (IRFs) of the reservation price gap (RPG) in up and down
markets. Note: The graphs contain the accumulated IRFs of the RPG to innovations of delinquency rates in up
(left) and down (right) markets. The two dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval
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B) and investment conditions (Panel C), which tend to deteriorate as investors
observe a widening gap between reservation prices of buyers and sellers. The
innovation tends to be embedded in investors’ attitudes two quarters after the
new information in the RPG measure is released and the effect fades away after
about 8 to 10 quarters. A similar impact of pricing on delinquency rates (and
attitudes of vulture investors) is shown in Panel D, where delinquency rate
increases with the widening RPG. This is particularly the case over first six
quarters as the new information in RPG becomes available.
Robustness Checks: Fixed Effects and Lags
We estimate Eqs. 6 to 9 (a to c) with four lags including sector fixed effects,
and we find a confirmation of our main findings. Table 7 shows the results
obtained using the reservation price gap (RPGit) as presented in Eqs. 6a to 9a.
Four columns report estimates from Eq. 7 (including the sector fixed effects)
using four different proxies for market expectations (Atti,t-j) - buy-sell recom-
mendations (BUYSELLit) in column 1, marketing time (TOMit) in column 2,
investment conditions (INVCONDit) in column 3 and delinquency rates of
commercial real estate (DELIQ_CREit) in column 4. Clearly, both the coeffi-
cients and their significance are similar to the ones obtained for models without
fixed effects (refer to 3rd column of Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6). Estimations using
the demand- and supply-side returns (respectively Retdi,t-j in Eqs. 6b to 9b and
a b
c d
Fig. 9 Feedback loop – impulse response functions (IRFs) of investor’s attitudes. Note: The graphs contain
the IRFs of investor’s attitudes (marketing time, buy/sell recommendations, investment conditions and
delinquency rates) to innovation in the reservation price gap (RPG). The two dotted lines represent the 95%
confidence interval
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Retsi,t-j in Eqs. 6c to 9c) also show results in line with our main findings.
However, we do not present those for the sake of parsimony in reporting.
Finally, we estimate Eqs. 6 to 9 (a through c), incorporating sector fixed
effects and using 8 lags. We report our results in Table 8 (similar structure of
four columns as in Table 7). Overall, our main findings are confirmed, and we
generally obtain coefficients with a similar sign and significance. The impulse
response functions also reveal similar results, and we do not report those for
the sake of parsimonious reporting.
Conclusion
We examine various indicators of demand-supply imbalances and their relation-
ship to the dynamics of price determination in real estate market. Our theoret-
ical hypotheses are based on the possibility of shifts in bargaining power and
heterogeneous signal processing by buyers and sellers that can lead to a diverse
range of actions for buy/sell decisions and asymmetric adjustments in reserva-
tion prices. Several real estate sectors over 1995–2010 are studied to inform our
analysis. The timeframe of our analysis allows us to observe market dynamics
over two economic cycles. Our empirical framework uses a range of indicators
of investment attitudes and market expectations (marketing time, buy-sell rec-
ommendation, investment conditions and financial distress measures) to explain
asymmetry in reservation price adjustments within a panel VAR approach.
The main results suggest strong and statistically significant feedback effects
from these indicators in price determination. We find evidence of asymmetric
responses during the boom, normal and recessionary periods. The demand-
supply mismatch and indicators of market expectations appear to exert much
more pronounced effects during down cycles than up cycles. This is probably
due to a high level of cautiousness being exercised more often by both buyers
and sellers during the down cycles, and any revisions to price expectations and
reservation prices are much more carefully thought through and executed by the
economic agents.
These results have important implications for the investment market and
forecasting exercises. The underlying theme of this paper revolves around shifts
in bargaining power from buyers to sellers and vice versa depending on the
market conditions. The main findings of this paper can inform institutional
interventions for the property and broader financial sectors during the times
of market turmoil. An effective management of market expectations is key to
achieve market stability and minimize the aftershocks. Future research may
investigate cross-sectional and multi-country evidence of the findings in this
paper, as the size and direction of the effects may depend on the country-
specific institutional frameworks and regulatory constraints affecting investment
conditions for real estate.
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Table 7 Panel VAR Estimation – All Property and Sectors. (Reservation Price Gap and Investors’ Attitudes).









Panel A: Constant and autoregressive coeffiencients (t-stats in italics)
Constant 0.0251 0.0131 0.0251 0.0259
t-stat 0.0348 0.0475 0.0432 0.0674
GDPR −0.1654 −0.0088 −0.3836 −1.1954
t-stat −0.2461 −0.0112 −0.05383 −1.5221
CPI −1.8625* −1.1634 −1.5833 −2.8694***
t-stat −1.7932 −0.7831 −1.3693 −2.4298
D(INT10Y-CPI) 0.1545 0.9367 −0.0855 1.7969**
t-stat 0.2253 1.1530 −0.1192 2.0937
D(INT_TERM) 1.2516 1.0303 2.752*** −1.2019
t-stat 1.3079 1.0924 2.6974 −1.2750
D(CREDSPR) 0.0202 0.0113 0.0175 0.0422***
t-stat 1.2964 0.6712 0.9965 2.1933
AR(1) −0.0926 0.0222 −0.0186 −0.0495
t-stat −1.2125 0.3264 −0.2763 −0.7806
AR(2) −0.552*** −0.447*** −0.5413*** −0.4266***
t-stat −7.3920 −6.9977 −8.1361 −6.9407
AR(3) −0.1194 −0.0010 −0.0444 −0.0081
t-stat −1.5473 −0.0146 −0.6452 −0.1337
AR(4) 0.0430 0.1493*** 0.0227 0.1000
t-stat 0.5802 2.2516 0.3280 1.6712
Panel B: Sum of 4 quarterly coeffiecients (p value of Granger-causality Wald test in italics)
Attit −0.0045 −0.0774 −0.0456* 0.0038
p value 0.2938 0.1253 0.0660 0.1652
Attit * UP Dummy −0.0175 −0.2599** 0.0343 0.2656
p value 0.1011 0.0372 0.2099 0.4484
Attit * DOWN Dummy −0.0440 0.1606* 0.1009*** −0.2422***
p value 0.1038 0.0993 0.0009 0.0000
Panel C: Overall statistics
F-statistic 5.32 6.29 5.39 7.60
Adj. R-squared 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.39
Akaike AIC −2.74 −2.74 −2.70 −2.84
Schwarz SC −2.35 −2.37 −2.35 −2.49
Results for reservation price gap (RPG) measures are obtained from the estimation of Eq. 5a in a panel VAR
with four quarterly lags and sector fixed effects. Each column reports the results using a different Investors
Attitude (Attit) measure: marketing time (1), buy vs sell recommendations (2), investment conditions (3) and
delinquency rates (3), in a panel VAR with four quarterly lags. Panel B reports the Granger-causality Wald test
for the 4 lags of the investors’ attitude jointly. Panel C includes the main overall statistics of the models
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Table 8 Panel VAR Estimation – All Property and Sectors. (Reservation Price Gap and Investors’ Attitudes).









Panel A: Constant and autoregressive coeffiencients (t-stats in italics)
Constant 0.0279 0.0411 0.227 0.0105
t-stat 0.0289 0.0626 0.0241 0.0073
GDPR −0.7100 2.3086*** −0.8578 0.1268
t-stat −0.8354 2.2718 −0.9004 0.1312
CPI −1.6295 −4.3397*** −2.1220 −0.7263
t-stat −1.3003 −2.3117 −1.3682 −0.5108
D(INT10Y-CPI) 0.3384 −1.5296 −0.5940 4.1741***
t-stat 0.4405 −1.3262 −0.6561 4.1932
D(INT_TERM) 0.3502 2.2522** 2.6305** −3.4287***
t-stat 0.2997 2.1055 1.9617 −2.9002
D(CREDSPR) 0.0144 −0.0643** −0.0152 0.1143***
t-stat 0.7269 −2.2081 −0.6770 3.1918
AR(1) −0.0893 −0.0571 −0.0597 −0.1828***
t-stat −1.0292 −0.7870 −0.7706 −2.6587
AR(2) −0.5765*** −0.5414*** −05545*** −0.6144**
t-stat −7.0053 −7.7342 −7.7452 −8.6277
AR(3) −0.1299 0.0449 −0.1111 −0.1675**
t-stat −1.3082 0.5477 −1.2251 −2.0342
AR(4) −0.0449 −0.0008 −0.0706 −0.1158
t-stat −0.4727 −0.0098 −0.7965 −1.3905
Panel B: Sum of 4 quarterly coeffiecients (p value of Granger-causality Wald test in italics)
Attit −0.0188** −0.2432*** −0.0539* 1.6456***
p value 0.0170 0.0065 0.0892 0.0000
Attit * UP Dummy −0.033** −1.4078*** 0.1796** −0.706***
p value 0.0433 0.0056 0.0100 0.0017
Attit * DOWN Dummy −0.0654 1.2921*** 0.1085** −2.2919***
p value 0.2444 0.0000 0.0135 0.0000
Panel C: Overall statistics
F-statistic 3.57 5.74 4.56 7.00
Adj. R-squared 0.35 0.46 0.38 0.51
Akaike AIC −2.69 −2.89 −2.72 −2.95
Schwarz SC −2.01 −2.26 −2.12 −2.35
Results for reservation price gap (RPG) measures are obtained from the estimation of Eq. 5a in a panel VAR
with eight quarterly lags and sector fixed effects. Each column reports the results using a different investors’
attitude (Attit) measure: marketing time (1), buy vs sell recommendations (2), investment conditions (3) and
delinquency rates (3), in a panel VAR with four quarterly lags. Panel B reports the Granger-causality Wald test
for the 4 lags of the investors’ attitude jointly. Panel C includes the main overall statistics of the models
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